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Address by Professor Edwin O. Reischauer 
at the Fiftieth Commencement of 
Connecticut College 
June 2, 1968 
Thank you very much, President Shain for your kind introductory remarks - -
Members of the Graduating Class of 1968, students, faculty and friends of Connecticut 
College. 
It is a pleasure and an honor to be with you on this significant occasion, but 
at the same time I must confess to some dismay at my appointed task, which is to try 
to say something appropriate and meaningful in the brief format of a Commencement 
address •. For you members of the graduating class this day marks an important transition 
from the sixteen years of the routine educational process to greater specialization in 
graduate schools or the commencement of professional or domestic careers. Traditional 
commencement day rhetoric runs to the standard themes of achievement, responsibility, 
challenge, and hope, intoned ritualistically by the speaker and accepted passively 
by his listeners. But somehow this academic "shrine festival," as the Japanese would 
call it -- in our terminology we might say a secular mass -- seems inappropriate in 
this year 1968. The times are out of joint and are not to be set right simply by 
conventional phrases. 
The usual picture of carefree college days spent in cloistered ivy-covered halls 
was never entirely true and has even less validity today. Students of the present 
generation are seized by the frustrations and anxieties of the times and feel these 
perhaps with greater poignancy than do their elders, just because of the greater 
doubts and uncertainties that face those not yet sure of how they fit into this 
vastly complicated and confusing world in which we all find ourselves. 
Young people also may feel the anguish of our time more strongly than their 
elders, because, in their time perspective, they are naturally more sharply focused 
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on this moment in history. As a result, they may have a keener sensibility to 
current problems than do older generations, whose senses may have been blunted by 
time. On the other hand, those with longer experience and therefore a broader time 
perspective may be able to see some aspects of our problems in better balance. 
Both perceptions of reality have their own validity. The need is to combine 
them. We need a dialogue between generations, just as we need a dialogue between 
the various ethnic and social groups and educational and functional levels that 
constitute this complex nation. 
I should, therefore, like to take this brief time set �side for my talk to try 
to contribute to this dialogue. The task you and I and all of us face is to try 
to achieve a better understanding of the bewildering problems that encompass us, 
so that we can cope with them more successfully. Let me comment on these problems 
from my own particular perspective as an historian and as one whose life and 
professional career has made him look at this country from the outside as much as 
from within. 
We all would agree that the United States faces a very grave crisis in 1968. 
In my judgment, it is a more serious challenge to the whole American system, both 
dream and reality, than any we have faced since the Civil War. Certainly in my 
own lifetime there has been nothing like it. During the Great Depression we faced 
much greater economic problems; there was even reason to doubt that we still had 
a viable economic system. But it was clear what the enemy was -- unemployment and 
economic want -- and the nation remained united and hopeful in combatting these 
foes. In the Second World War, Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan posed a very 
real threat to the sort of world system of diversity and mutual tolerance that we 
have always believed in. But again the enemy was clear, and despite real danger 
and great pain we remained united and hopeful as a nation. 
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Today, by contrast, we are not menaced by hostile expanding empires abroad 
or by the threat of economic collapse at home. In fact, we have been misled by a 
sense of international omnipotence and have had our wits and feelings dulled by a 
surfeit of affluence. In most measurable things wealth, education, leisure -- 
the great bulk of Americans seem much better off than ever before. Many of our 
most obvious ills, even our greatest ill of racial discrimination, while admittedly 
very bad, are at least a little less severe than a few decades ago. 
And yet the national mood runs from grim apprehension to deep despairo There 
is a wider sense of alienation from society than has ever �xisted in our country 
before, especially among young people and underprivileged groups. There are even 
voices calling for revolution. 
To many members of the older generation all this is bewildering. When things 
seem to them better than what they knew in their youth, how can it be that their 
children should find things so much worse? There are reasons, I believe, for the 
apparent contradiction, and, if we could but see them, we could understand better 
the nature of the crisis that we face. 
The irony of our situation is that our very progress, as progress is usually 
measured, lies at the root of our problemso In technological skills, in mastery 
of our natural environment, we are moving ahead at a tremendous and accelerating 
speed. Our wealth increases at a dizzying pace. So also does our strength and 
size. But so also do the complexity and pressures of our �hole society and the 
size and intricacy of its problems. Our wealtr :p,llutes our environment and entraps 
us in urban congestion. People are increasingly lost in the vastness and intricacy 
of modern society. The individual loses his sense of identity. He feels alienated 
from the huge system which he no longer can understand. 
Technological advances bring change at an ever increasing rate. To cope with 
these rapid changes, the social mechanism -- that is political, economic, social, 
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and educational institutions -- must develop a capacity to make constantly more 
complicated and delicate decisions at ever increasing speeds, And values, or 
at least their formulation, need constant reassessment to keep up with changes in 
both technology and institutions. It is not surprising that many of our 
institutions fail to keep pace with change, or that our value system seems to 
become outdated. Dangerous gaps develop between technology and institutions and 
between institutions and moral values. 
Each new generation growr up in what seems to it an entirely new world. It 
finds itself beset by increasing pressures of competition in an educational 
system that is growing rapidly in size and intricacy. The problems of choice in 
an increasingly complex world become ever more baffling and frustrating. The 
experience of earlier generations in a simpler age may seem no longer relevant, 
and a gap in understanding develops between the generations. 
At the same time, the rapid advance of modern technology produces a demand for 
constantly rising levels of skill, which often prove to be beyond the capacities· 
of the underprivileged, whose environment and education have not prepared them 
for the modern world. At a less advanced economic stage we had the problem of 
the unemployed, but now we face the mounting problem of the unemployable -- those 
whose skills do not measure up to the minimum levels set by an increasingly 
complicated and affluent society. Thus to the drop-outs produced by the psychological 
and educational pressures of modern society, we add the drop-outs produced by 
the rising technological standards of our economy. 
All these problems add up to a dehumanizing of our civilization. Year by year 
we are all becoming less individual men and more just numbers. The human mind and 
soul are being subjected to the computer. Increasingly the less favored are finding 
no place at all in what the disenchanted call "the system." And the system itself -
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the decision making process - is becoming so complex that no one can fully understand 
it, much less control it. Individuals everywhere cry out against the obvious 
iniquities it produces, but remedies are not easily found. The supposed correction 
of one ill so commonly produces a worse ill. We run the danger of becoming the 
slaves ,f the machine we have built, but dismantling this machine would not be 
the solution, as some visionaries believe, unless we are prepared for a drastic 
fall in economic levels and a great reduction of our vast urban population through 
starvation. No, the only solution is to rehumanize our civilization by putting 
individuals above machines and by devising better ways fop human judgment and moral 
values to shape and guide "the system". 
These problems, of course, are not unique to the United States. They are endemic 
in all the more advanced nations and might be called the "growing pains" of the 
modernization process. I am quite familiar with them in Japan, where dazzling 
success in economic growth and unparalleled speed of change have for long produced 
serious symptoms of alienation among both intellectuals and the little man lost 
in the great cities, and student unrest has been persistent and violent. 
There may be comfort in knowing that others face these same problems, but 
we should realize that we probably face them in greater degree simply because of 
the huge size and tremendous complexity of our country. As an economic 1•nit, we 
are more than twice the size of our nearest competitor, the Sovie_t Uni on, about 
six times the size of the next national unit, Japan, and 40 or more times the size 
of the middle-sized and smaller countries of Western Europe, In our geographic 
and ethnic diversity, in our relatively free and diverse institutions, and in our 
extraordinarily decentralized political system, we face vastly more intricate 
problems than do the much more homogeneous and centralized national units of Japan 
and Western Europe, or the much more closely controlled Soviet Union, which is 
our only close counterpart in size and diversity. 
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Take, for example, the very fundamental problem of providing adequate 
educational opportunities to all, so that there will not be an underprivileged 
educational minority that becomes the unemployable drop-outs of the economic 
system. Japan faces no such problem, because its more centralized educational 
system does not permit great discrepancies to grow up between urban and rural 
schools, or between schools in rich and poor neighborhoods. We can identify the 
problem, but to equalize educational opportunities between Mississippi and 
California or between Harlem and Westchester will take some serious reworking 
of the concepts and institutions we have inherited from the eighteenth century. 
Thus we see that our size and diversity, while giving us great advantages 
economically, also give us greater problems than those faced by most advanced 
nations. This alone, however, is not enough to explain the very special sense of 
crisis of this year 1968. I believe that our present crisis is the product of 
the fact that, on top of the world-wide problem of the dehumanizing of civilization 
that I have been describing, two very special American problems have come to a 
head at this time, each drawing further heat from the other and both accentuating 
this broader problem, One, of course, is the foreign policy disaster in Vietnam, 
about which I wish to speak in some detail, since it comes closer to my own field 
of specialized knowledge. The other is the problem of race, which has been so 
shamefully neglected for a whole century that it has now reached explosive 
proportions. 
To some young people, these two special problems both seem so inexcusable 
that they find it hard to believe that they are just the product of ignorance, 
prejudice, and sloth. Instead they see in them proof of a fundamentally immoral 
society that must be destroyed by revolution. I sympathize with their moral 
indignation, but my own historical perspective does not permit me to agree with 
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assumptions that what would replace the society they wish to destroy would be 
better, rather than worse, than what exists. My own study and experience convince 
me that constructive reform, rather than destructive revolution, is the best way 
to build a better society. 
Be that as it may, however, we face today two very great and specific crises 
in our national life, and neither will be quickly solved. Equalization of 
opportunity will take a great restructuring of our educational facilities and 
our patterns of urban and rural life, and only after this is done can we begin 
to overcome the real problem, as new generations grow up with more equal 
opportunities. Better race relations also require so fundamental an alteration in 
attitudes that they can be accomplished only through the most basic of all 
mechanisms of social change -- a change in generations. The tragedy of our 
present situation is that, while we must work hard to ameliorate our domestic 
crisis immediately and on a crash basis, we can hope to solve it only over the course 
of decades. 
Our foreign policy crisis, in so far as it is the specific problem of Vietnam, 
is more open to quick solution, but the underlying problem of our relationship with 
Asia and the rest of the less-developed world will take_ even longer to solve than 
our domestic problem, because it is so much bigger. 
Those who have for the first time become conscious of Vietnam and the broader 
problem of our relationship with Asia only at this time of disaster, cannot 
really be blamed for jumping to the conclusion that our policies have been so bad 
that they could only be the product of evilly motivated men making immoral decisions. 
But this, I believe, is a serious misjudgment, which can only further confuse the 
issue. Having lived through the last few decades of shifting American attitudes 
toward Asia and having seen our policies developed step by step, often in ways 
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against which I have argued, I believe that I have a clearer concept of what has 
gone wrong. The whole story, as I see it, is not one of evil intentions but of 
ignorance, wrong judgments and inadvertent steps. Small and seemingly innocuous 
decisions led to unexpected results and new and more difficult problems. To put 
it another way, our Vietnam fiasco is essentially the product of a decision making 
process that has fallen behind the realities of the situation. 
We also might say that our Vietnam crisis is, in a sense, a product of our size. 
We were the only major country to survive the Second World War relatively unscathed, 
and as a result we found heavy responsibilities resting on our shoulders. We 
responded in good spirit to this challenge, but without a sufficient depth of 
knowledge or experience, especially in the less familiar parts of the world. The 
situation demanded decisions and action by us. We did many things well in Europe 
and Japan and in pioneering the concept that advanced nations should give aid to 
the less advanced. Our successes helped produce in us a false sense of omnipotence. 
And since we took the major actions in the world, we also made the major mistakes. 
Smaller countries have by their lesser size been spared these problems. 
If we look more specifically at our errors in Vietnam, we will see how they 
grew primarily out of our ignorance and our unfamiliarity with the responsibilities 
the Second World War left on our shoulders. In 1945, because of our concern about 
the sensibilities of our friends in the war-ravaged lands of Western Europe, we 
condoned and even aided the restoration of the colonial empires of Asia, when all 
people who knew much about Asia at that time could see that the age of colonialism 
was passing and that our national instincts and our interests in Asia both called 
for support for revolutionary nationalism. But being a country oriented primarily 
toward Europe, rather than Asia, we made unsound decisions about Asia based on 
concerns over Europe. 
-9-
Subsequently, we drew an analogy from what we thought to be the problem we 
faced in Europe and applied it and the solution we designed for the European 
problem to a fundamentally different situation in Asia. In Europe, we saw the 
danger of a militarily powerful Communist movement under unified Soviet control 
seizing mastery over a potentially powerful but temporarily disrupted Western 
Europe and thereby turning the balance of power in the world drastically against 
us. Our answer was a.unified defense through NATO and a rapid restoration of 
Western Europe's economic and political viability through the Marshall Plan. 
Whether or not this "cold war" view of the problem was correct in Europe, it 
was a serious distortion of the problem in Asia, and the counter measures that 
proved so successful in Europe have proved disastrously wrong in Asia. The 
less-developed countries of Asia were not a potentially significant factor in a 
world balance of power. Nationalism was a stronger force than Communism, and as 
a consequence there was no unified Communist movement that could sweep the 
continent. Less-developed nations, once fired by nationalism, were capable of 
a guerrilla resistance that made outside control and exploitation impossible. 
This is the meaning of the failure of the Japanese military juggernaut in China as 
well as our own agony in Vietnam. There is no reason to believe that Chinese 
and Russians would be any more successful than we or the Japanese if they attempted 
to overrun Asian nations, which in any case they have not tried to d9 and are not 
likely to attempt. 
The problem the countries of Asia faced was primarily one of internal stability 
and development, not of external aggression. They needed economic and technological 
aid from us, not defense. Mutual defense alliances proved to be empty except for 
a unilateral American commitment, often to a status quo which needed changing. Our 
resemblance to erstwhile colonial masters sometimes made our military help more 
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weakening than strengthening. The same was true of the massive economic impact 
of our military intervention, which tended to corrupt local societies and distort 
their economies. There could be no quick economic and political recovery, as 
happened through Marshall Plan aid in Europe, but only the start of a long, slow 
climb from a pre-industrial form of society to a more modern one. Our chief 
efforts thus were misdirected to the building of defense alliances and the 
supporting of politically friendly regimes, when they should have been devoted 
to long-term growth and developmento 
It is not surprising that, with such a serious misconception of the problem 
and of our capacities to affect it, we have ended up in a great disaster in 
Vietnam. The tragedy of the situation is that our very size now makes it all 
the harder to correct our mistake. If we were a smaller country, say like France, 
the error, once perceived, could, with resolution, be quickly corrected. A sharp 
reversal of course might be humiliating, but the damage would only be to our pride. 
But, given our size, the problem is much greater than this. Most of the world 
depends on commitments by us or at least on our predictability, and, if we were 
to prove erratic in our actions, the whole world would be seriously shaken. And 
if in our humiliation we withdrew into a sullen isolationism from the less-developed 
parts of the world, we would be withdrawing from them much of the economic aid 
and sympathetic concern that this underprivileged two-thirds of the world so 
desperately needs. The faith of other nations in us and our own faith in ourselves, 
so that we will be able to aid constructively in the development of a better 
world, are what are primarily at stake in the current negotiations in Paris. 
This is not a good year for political predictions, but I will admit to 
a relatively optimistic view of the possibilities of ending the Vietnam War through 
negotiations within a reasonable period of time -- say six months to two years. 
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I am even optimistic that we shall be able to learn through the bitter experience of 
Vietnam what we should have realized much earlier -- that conditions in various 
parts of Asia are very different from those of Europe and require much more study 
and understanding on our part if we are to develop wise policies and avoid urther 
disasters. 
I must confess, however, to considerable apprehension that in our revulsion 
from the Vietnam fiasco and in our realization that the immediate strategic 
stakes in Asia are much less than the "cold warriors" of the 19SO's assumed, we 
may relax into indifference to the very real but long-range problem of our 
relationship with Asia. 
To understand our true interests in Asia, it may be helpful to draw an 
analogy to our great domestic crisis. In a simpler age, great discrepancies of 
wealth and opportunity, far from undermining society, constituted its very 
foundations. Once the lord could live in relative opulence in the manor house 
on the hill, while his tenants clustered miserably in their huts at its base. 
Even in the nineteenth century, our society proved stable and viable though the 
majority of the people remained seriously underprivileged by contemporary standards. 
But today, in the closer integration of contemporary society and in the whole 
equalitarian ethos of our contemporary system, the existence of an underprivileged, 
undereducated fifteen or twenty per cent of the population is no� only an affront 
to our ideals but a threat to the very existence of our society. 
Similarly, vast discrepancies in wealth and opportunity between the various 
regions and nations of the world proved no great problem even into the early 
decades of this century. Distances were too great and contacts too tenuouso 
But the world is shrinking rapidly, and interrelations are multiplyingo Common 
attitudes and aspirations sweep the world. Under these circumstances the great 
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imbalance between the rich one-third of the world and the poor two-thirds is 
clearly a mounting problem. With each passing decade it will become more severe, 
until it too may reach the explosive proportions our domestic imbalance has 
reached. If this should happen, the problem will be much greater, because the 
proportions are very different. It will not be an underprivileged fifteen or 
twenty per cent as opposed to a privileged majority but an underprivileged two-thirds 
of the world against a privileged minority. The gap between the two groups is 
still growing bigger, rather than shrinking. If we ignore this problem, the way 
we ignored our problems of race and the underprivileged at home, we shall be 
bequeathing to the next generation even greater problems than we face today. 
These comments on our great crisis f 1968 have been very brief and 
fragmentary, and they are, of course, limited by the necessarily narrow angle of 
vision of a single individual. I hope, however, that my approach may have thrown 
clarifying light on at least some aspects of the problems we face. 
I trust that I have, at least, shown that a major aspect of our Vietnam 
problem is the inadequacy of our decision-making process, resulting in part from 
its complexity but, in this case, even more from ignorance and inattention. 
We inevitably will continue to be, if not one-third of the world economically, 
at least the largest single unit in the world and, therefore, a nation that must 
undertake large responsibilities. To do this successfully, we must have more 
understanding of the complex realities of other nations - especially those of the 
less-developed parts of the world which we understand so little. This demands a 
great, conscious effort on our part - not only at the college level but through­
out our educational system and throughout adult societyo The same need for more 
study and more understanding, I believe, lies at the bottom of our domestic 
problems, too. 
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In closing, I wish that I could giv you the reassuring prediction that we 
shall certainly overcome our great looming problems, but, in all honesty, 
I cannot do so. We have no assurance that we shall be able to handle adequately 
the two immediate crises of Vietnam and the race problem. We have even less 
assurance that the seemingly inevitable growth in size and complexity of our 
society and the resultant building up of pressures on us as individuals and on 
our collective institutions will not eventually overwhelm our civilization, either 
through some unmanagable catastrophe or in the form of a long Roman twilight. 
If we are to extricate ourselves from our two current crises anr go on surmount­
ing the rising difficulties of the whole modernization process, we will need to 
bring to bear all our powers of analysis and understanding; we will need all the 
clarity of thought and balance of judgment we can mustero Whether we can do so 
successfully depends on our combined efforts, but in the long run it depends much 
more on people of your generation than on mine. 
